Abstract-The increasing array of Internetscale threais is a pressing problem for every organization that utilizes the network. Organizations have limited resources to detect and respond to these threats. The end-to-end (E2E) sharing of information related to probes and attacks is a facet of an emerging trend toward "collaborative security."
INTRODUCTION
As the threat to critical infrastructure computer networks grows, the ability to rapidly and correctly identify, rank, and react to probes and attacks is of acute importance. The exchange of alert data between administrative domains can effectively supplement the knowledge gained from local sensors. Intrusion detection systems (IDS'S) are typicalIy constrained within one administrative domain. In such an environment, information about the global state of network attack patterns is necessarily unexamined. Global information can aid organizations in ranking and addressing threats that they do perceive and alerting organizations to threats they would not otherwise have recognized.
Most current IDS's do not adequately address the need for information exchange. In addition, the fail-open nature of IDS's makes them a natural target for attacks [I] . Any distributed IDS must enforce mechanisms that support the reliability of its nodes as well as the integrity and confidentiality of the alerts exchanged between those nodes. We propose a collaborative distributed approach to intrusion detection and present a system that addresses the challenges of information sharing.
Several problems must be addressed before intrusion alert information can be safely distributed among cooperating sites. First, the currently observable rates of alert generation preclude the use of solutions incorporating a centralized system to aggregate and correlate alert information. Administrators need a reasonable chance to respond to the threats that are perceived by the system; replicating all alert information and forwarding it to a common central node places considerable trust in that node and risks both a single point of failure and the increasing congestion of the network near that node. Third, exchanging alert data in a full mesh quadratically increases bandwidth requirements. Fourth, information exchange between administrative domains needs to be carefully managed, as proprietary or confidential network data may escape the boundary of each domain. Finally, any partitioning of the alert information into distinct sets defined by the different domains may cause information loss by disassociating data that should have been considered in the same context. 0-7803-9290-61051$20 .00 02005 IEEE. 333
RELATED WORK
Previous work on distributed intrusion detection has focused mainly on the exchange of data within a single organization. Much of this work has focused on distributed collection and centralized correlation 121 . The DShield project [3] is an example of a centralized repository that receives intrusion alerts from many distributed sources. Only recently has research been performed on systems that support the exchange of data between administrative domains. Cuppens and Miege [4] ,
[5] discuss methods for cooperatively correlating alerts from different types of intrusion detection systems. DOMINO [6] is an overlay network that utilizes the Chord [7] protocol to distribute alert information based on a hash of the source IP address.
CARDS is a prototype distributed intrusion detection system that uses "attack trees", or pre-defined sequences of attack steps. CARDS decomposes global representations of distributed attacks into smaller units (called detection l a s h ) that correspond to the distributed events indicating the attacks, and then executes and coordinates the detection tasks in the places where the corresponding events are observed, While fast algorithms for signature and string matching exist, the best known are of complexity O ( n log3 n). One notable followup work is constructing new ,attack sequences [8] to keep the signature database up to date.
Krugel et al. [9] propose a peer-to-peer system that recognizes attacks in a distributed manner. The system is interesting because their results indicate two things. First, only a relatively small number of messages (seldom more than two in their experiments) need to be exchanged to determine an attack is in progress. Second, their work confirms that a peer-topeer approach to decentralized intrusion detection is feasible and appropriate. However, the system requires that attack signatures be known a priori.
The research closest to ours in aim and scope is the recent work by Lincoln, Porras, and Shmatikov [IOij. The authors present a scheme for Internet-scale collaborative analysis of information security threats and claim that it provides strong privacy guarantees to contributers of alerts. The authors sanitize and replicate alert data to enable alert correlation between cooperating peers. While the authors are mostly concerned with the scrubbing of alerts, we examine the need for the construction of an efficient distribution mechanism as well as alert privacy.
Huang and Wicks [ 1 I ] presents an exploration of the relevant features of attacks, concluding that reconstructing attack strategies is the appropriate method for balancing the cost of distributed correlation with the utility of global knowledge.
A recent study by Moore et al. [ 121 defines the resources needed to counter worm propagation. They conclude that a response needs to be mounted in 2-3 minutes and that participation of nearly all major AS's is required to be effective. The authors are pessimistic about the preparedness of the general Internet for preventing and containing worm outbreaks. Their results suggest that both technological and administrative issues must be addressed before any effective defense can be mounted against such Internet-wide threats. While these numbers are specifically derived in the context of quarantining Internet worms, their results show that current and foreseeable threats demand a cooperative and collaborative approach to achieving security.
Secure multi-party computation (SMC), initiated by [ 131, [14] 
ARCHITECTURE
We adopt two mechanisms in order to cope with the difficulties of distributed correlation and the potential volume of data being correlated. First, the construction of Bloom filters by Worminator is employed to protect the confidentiality of the data being exchanged between domains. Second, efficient information exchange is accomplished with a distributed correlation scheduling algorithm. The schedu'ling algorithm dynamically calculates subsets of correlation peers that should communicate to exchange Bloom filters. Since information is also compacted by the Bloom filter, correlation between peers becomes extremely cost-effective in terms of bandwidth and processing power. [ 121, prosecution, or military action. A. Requirements the design of our system has emerged: From our discussion above, a set of requirements that guides 1 ) The exchange of alert information must not leak potentially sensitive data. 2) Large alert rates hide stealthy activity; any reasonable solution must deal with or reduce the effects of these rates.
3) Centralized repositories are single points of failure and likely unable to correlate the burgeoning amount of alerts. 4) Exchanging alerts in a full mesh quadratically increases the complexity of the problem. 5 ) Any solution that partitions data among nodes risks information loss by disassociating evidence that should be considered in the same context. We make several assumptions about the environment the system exists in and the alert information the system exchanges. Our assumptions and choices are intended to carefully balance the requirements of data privacy with the need to derive useful information and actionable intelligence from the alert exchange.
The environment and user base for a collaborative distributed intrusion detection system is an important consideration. We envision cohorts of 25 to 100 organizations exchanging information. Such cohorts can be organizations with similar interests, such as universities, financial institutions, military or government networks, energy companies, news organizations, etc.
The sheer volume of alert streams is a critical consideration in the design and evaluation of any distributed intrusion detection system. The size of current (and foreseeable) alert streams demands low-cost processing and correlation. Alert streams can threaten to dominate network bandwidth if they are unnecessarily replicated.
Perhaps the most important decision we make is to employ the use of "watchlists," or lists of IP addresses suspected of subversive behavior. The task of the distributed detection system is not to analyze the network or host events of other domains, but rather to correlate summaries of alerts to identify attackers. Therefore, watchlists encapsulate the appropriate information to exchange.
B. Preserving Privacy
While IDS alerts themselves could be distributed, there are two substantial disadvantages to doing this: first, organizations 0-7803-9290-6/05/$20.00 02005 IEEE. 334 may have privacy policies or concems about siharing detailed IP data, some of which might uncover who they normally communicate with. Second, these alert files grow rapidly given substantial traffic. While parameters may be tweaked to reduce potential noise, a preferable solution would be to encode the relevant information in a compact yet useful manner. We provide a compact format via the use of Bloom filters. A Bloom filter is a one-way data structure that supports two operations: insertion and verification, e.g., while no data can be extracted after being inserted in the Bloom filter, it is probabilistically possible to see if specific data has been inserted if presented a second time to the Bloom filter. This is accomplished by creating a compact bit vector (typically between 215 -220 entries). Entries are indexed by the hash of the original data, i.e., a high-quality hash of original data (in this case, IPS and port information) is generated, broken up into parts, and these parts are used as indices into the bit vector. Each resolved index in the bit vector is set to 1. This process is typically repeated multiple times (for different parts of the hash and/or different hashes), thereby increasing resiliency to noise or data saturation. Verification is similar to insertion; instead of actually setting bits, the bit vector is examined to determine if the bits are already set. Therefore, the IDS parses its alert output and generates Bloom filters corresponding to (for example) IP/port endpoint data.
Since Bloom filters are compact one-way data structures, we get three benefits:
Compactness: A Bloom filter smaller than 10k bits in size is still able to accurately verify tens of thousands of entries.
Resiliency, even when the Bloom filter is decreased in size: When the Bloom filter is saturated, it starts giving false positives (i.e., multiple data entries resolve to the same locations in the bit vector), but never gives false negatives. The false positives can be ameliorated by tuning or by correlation against multiple alert lists. Security: By utilizing a one-way data structure, organizations can correlate watchlists without releasing actual IP data, satisfying privacy needs while being able to participate. If further security from outside observers is needed, the dissemination protocol can be encapsulated in a secure tunnel, like SSL, thereby only granting Bloom filter access to the set of participants iln the alert list correlation.
C. Distributed Correlation
A distributed correlation function must overcome the problems of a centralized model while balancing the information loss inherent in partitioning alert data among different nodes. The most straightforward way to accomplish distribution (forwarding all data from every node to every other node) involves a quadratic increase in the amount of data exchanged.
More sophisticated approaches are based on two different theories. The first approach, which mirrors traditional DHTbased P2P networks, creates an explicit mapping from alert data (specifically, source and target IP addresses) to particular correlation nodes. The reasoning behind this approach is that source and target IP addresses are the two most important features (besides target port) of alert data. With data about various machines collected in one node, the majority of correlation can be accomplished at that node without communicating with other nodes (except to distribute results of global interest).
The shortcoming of this approach is that nodes become special cases of the centralized model: they are single points of failure for information pertaining to the IP address range being hashed. In addition, participants in the system may be uncomfortable with storing their raw alert information at a single node. This approach invests too much trust in each node. While a self-healing approach like Chord [7] can ameliorate the loss of a node, previous information stored at that node is at best lost temporarily (for example, in the case of a denial of service,) or corrupted (in the case of the node being compromised). Some of these shortcomings can be mitigated by replicating the data to some number of other nodes; however, it is not clear what the appropriate balance is between fault-tolerance through replication and utilization of network bandwidth and storage space. If data is replicated to every other node, we see an unacceptable quadratic increase in the cost of the system. Furthermore, while DHT-based overlays provide a fast lookup() operation, the performance of such networks under chum (rapid series of join() and leave() operations) is questionable [18] .
The second theory attempts to address the limitations of the first approach by introducing a dynamic mapping between nodes and content. This dynamic overlay network (as opposed to the largely static mappings of traditional DHT-based overlay networks) implicitly incorporates the notion of chum and does not need to spend time rebuilding neighbor (finger) tables. We observe that a theoretical optimal schedule exists for communicating information. If an oracle existed in the network that answered with the appropriate subset of nodes that should talk given a particular alert, links could be established between these nodes without talking to nodes with irrelevant data (e.g., without a lookup() operation).
In this model, we assume that there is a set of nodes S of size N. We assume that there is some reliable mechanism for any subset of nodes to communicate with each other. There is some discrete unit of knowledge K , that if known would provide evidence of a distributed scan. During a distributed scan, some subset of S is scanned and now contains a piece of knowledge Ki.
Normally, this knowledge would be discarded as insignificant. However, the optimal schedule allows this set of nodes to perfectly guess which of its neighbors also contains a piece of K . Note that each node could also find this information out via the O ( N 2 ) full mesh method of asking each other node in the network. However, we assert that this method is too costly in terms of trust, network bandwidth, and disk storage.
The key idea in this optimal schedule is that the correct subsets of nodes are always communicating. In order to mimic this behavior, the (approximately) correct nodes must talk to each other at (approximately) the right time. One way of accomplishing such a schedule is to pick relationships at random. Another way is to employ a publish-subscribe scheme. 0-7803-9290-6/05/$20.00 02005 IEEE.
D. Whirlpool: Network Scheduling
There is a clear need for efficient alert correlation in largescale distributed networks. To address this need. we introduce the notion of network scheduling: the controllable formation and dissolution of relationships between nodes and groups of nodes in a network. These relationships can be envisioned as a dynamic overlay. Our network scheduling mechanism is a procedure for coordinating the exchange of information between the members of a correlation group. The mechanism is controlled by a dynamic and parameterizable correlation schedule.
Our approach is predicated on the previously described theoretical model of the optimal correlation schedule, the shortcomings of a fully interconnected mesh of correlation nodes, and the limitations of the ideal centralized approach to large-scale correlation. The main difficulty is that nodes would most likely discard data that in truth belong to a distributed alert. We must develop a mechanism whereby a node can quickly conference with other peers and determine whether or not a local alert is noise or signifies part of a distributed alert.
The basic architecture of network scheduling is a set of dynamic federations. Nodes that join and leave these federations at various rates. The variance in rates is intended to allow federation groups to retain some stability while expediting the import of new information into the group. Furthermore, this mechanism can be augmented with a distributed learning algorithm that assists in promoting alerts discovered by the distributed correlation.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION

A. Worminator
The Worminator platform supports compact watchlist correlation via the replication and use of Bloom filters [19] and uses the Antura network intrusion detection system [20] , [21] to generate alerts. The Antura NIDS has been demonstrated to be an order-of-magnitude better at detecting long-term stealthy scans than competing products.
Our initial proof-of-concept version of Worminator ran at specific intervals on the computer running the Antura sensor, parsed its alert output, and generated Bloom filters corresponding to IP/port endpoint data. These alerts were then transmitted to a centralized node using HTTP, and correlation was manually initiated after-the-fact by downloading these Bloom filters from the centralized node. This proofof-concept prototype demonstrated the feasibility of the idea: in preliminary tests that correlated results from installations of Worminator at two academic sites, three common sources of stealthy surveillance were detected: one each in Reijing, the Phillippines, and a small western US community college. These sources are most probably interested in the test sites to discover weakly protected (but usually more powerful and better connected) university or research machines.
We have since evolved this version to better handle communication latency and privacy requirements. The current version of Worminator is completely pluggable, and supports different sensor and alert types, correlators, and communication frameworks. Just as importantly, it supports continuous validation; alerts from the sensor are exchanged immediately, and correlation runs real-time to glean data as soon as possible to help prepare defenses against pending attacks or fastmoving worms.
The goal is to enable sites to maintain a secure watchlist of alerts seen locally and from other sites, and to generate a warnlist of significant threats if they have been correlated as having been seen at multiple sites. This warnlist can then be reported to network administrators or could be directly mapped to firewall rules to prevent impending attacks. Depending on privacy policies, these local warnlists may also be explicitly replicated to other sites to enable a fast global-scale response.
Worminator consists of approximately 9,500 lines of Java code, and leverages a number of J2EE (Java 2 Enterprise Edition) providers, including the PostgreSQL JDBC provider (for querying databases), the Tomcat JSP/Servlet container (for the user interface), and the JBossMQ JMS provider (for event transport).
v. RESULTS
A. Worminator collaborative site experiment
The new version of Worminator was deployed at four different sites in the Northeast: two at Columbia (one on the perimeter of the Computer Science network and the other on the perimeter of a campus dorm), one at a company in midtown Manhattan, and the last a research institution in Washington, D.C. The Antura sensor was used as the source of alerts at each site, and Java Message Service, a publish-subscribe communication infrastructure, was leveraged to support event distribution amongst the sites. This configuration was run for approximately 96 hours. Information on source IPS and scan times were exchanged.
During the time, approximately 550,000 alerts were generated and exchanged. By far the most of these alerts (roughly 75%) were at the Computer Science network. In addition to traffic passing through the perimeter of the CS network, the CS sensor sees internal traffic between CS machines. (Ordinarily, the dorm network might be more saturated with malicious traffic, but this data was taken during Spring Break, when many undergraduates leave campus. The dorm sensor was also deployed later than the other sites, and had run for approximately two days.) Statistics on the watchlist: Sites, number of alerts exchanged, and
As Figure 1 implies, IPS generated more than one alert in some instances; nevertheless, the number of IPS is very large for each site, making individual alerting difficult. A total of 29,731 unique IPS were seen. Next, we ran queries 0-7803-9290-6/05/$20.00 02005 IEEE.
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United States Military Academy, West Point, NY to determine which sources were seen at two, three, or four sites.
Four
99.996% Fig. 2 . three, and at four collaborating sites.
Statistics on the wornlist: the number of source IPS detected at two,
The reduction by examining the set of common sources is remarkable -only 18 of the 29,731 original source IPS were observed at three sites. While this does not necessarily discount the other 29,713 IPS, the likelihood that legitimate traffic exists between three of these four unrelated sites is extremely low, and simple port analysis can help confirm this hypothesis. Note that, due to reduced activily at the dorm site, conclusions about the number of common sources at all four sites is preliminary at best, but the one site that matched originated from China. Further analysis from the CS sensor revealed that the machine was probing destination ports 1026 and 1027 -used by the Windows Messenger service [22] , strongly suggesting this IP was doing wholesale "pop-up" Internet spamming. While its activity may have been benign, such a source is clearly indicative of undesirable traffic, and leveraging the warnlist makes it easy to block such sources, be it undesirable or outright malicious.
We also performed some preliminary analysis on the twosite data to determine if a significant geographic distribution existed (e.g., if more scans originated from any particular site). Figure 3 illustrates the results of the top eight countries (which comprise 87% of the total scans -every other country contributed two or less IPS to the overall total). As the chart shows, China dominates, with nearly 49% of the top eight countries and 41% overall amongst all countries. This suggests that, despite the "great firewall of China", outbound scans and probes are unaffected and continue to propagate to a broad cross-section of the Intemet.
One interesting footnote: while performing analysis on the two-site data, two alerts were generated for the IP 1 2 8 . 9 . 1 6 8 . 4 5. Reverse DNS revealed the URL to be http: / / p t r . i s i . edu, which turns out to be an Intemet mapping server performing "low-volume'' scans. Indeed, this source comprised only .00007% of the total alert exchange, yet we were able to focus on the source with a minimum of effort.
This analysis only scratches the tip of the iceberg; it becomes clear, however, that useful data can easily be gleaned with just a few sites exchanging alerts. We plan to increase the number of participating sites, which will greatly increase the depth and breadth of the types of sources of surveillance and we expect it to further validate our approach.
B. Alert Rates
Intrusion detection systems face the very real threat of information loss from the sheer rate of available information. Schaelicke et al. [23] are decidedly pessimistic about the ability of relatively powerful commodity hardware and network links to absorb peak alert loads, noting that an IDS is effectively neutralized by the loss of alert data resulting from a database unable to keep up with incoming network data. This problem is compounded if multiple NIDS sensors report to the same database system. DShield reports about 10 million alert records added daily. DShield monthly alert record contributions. The graph is not cumulative, but rather shows the rapid increase in contributed alen information per month as DShield grew in popularity.
Event reduction and aggregation is a critical part of our system. Since we construct watchlists from very little information (an IP address and a port), we are interested in ways of combining different alert information. Reduction can be accomplished by filtering events either at the source sensor or prior to correlation processing. As a trivial example of the latter, consider a series of 100 basic IDS alerts with the same source and destination IP information and alert type information (e.g., "Host X probed host Y on port Z"). These alerts can be reduced to a single alert and a frequency If a 0-7803-9290-6/05/$20.00 02005 IEEE. signifcant portion of alert streams are amenable to this type of reduction, we can either perform more expensive processing on the resulting stream, or produce actionable intelligence more rapidly. Inexpensive reduction strategies (like logically grouping attacking IP source addresses in the same /24 subnet) can result in substantial compression, as is aggregation of multiple scan alerts (one per port) by a single source into one overall alert announcing a scan. For an example of the successfut application of these reduction strategies,
C. Network Schedule Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of the Whirlpool network scheduling, we compare it against a full mesh distribution scheme and a randoin selection distribution scheme. To that end, we introduce a Bandwidlh Efectiue Urilization Metric (BEUM). The BEUM is defined as:
where t is the average number of time units it takes the distribution scheme to detect an attack and B is the amount of bandwidth used by the distribution mechanism during that period. B is defined in terms of the total number of nodes, N. communicating via the distribution mechanism. Thus, for a full mesh scheme we have:
and the time to discover an attack is t == 1. The BEUM for a full mesh distribution strategy is therefore &. 
In general, if t 5 0, this particud schedule wins. Specifically, for a system of 100 nodes, the BEUM is &.
If 1 5 9, this schedule is a better choice than a full mesh.
Many other schedules are possible to balance the tradeoffs between bandwidth, coverage, and Latency and we are exploring methods for identifying optimal schedules given a set of constraints.
We simulated a randomized scheduling strategy for a system of 100 nodes (performed over 1000 trials). Our simulations indicate that on average, it takes 6 time units before an attack is detected using a repeated random schedule. This time unit requirement satisfies the requirement for t 5 10 we derived for the BEUM. Figure 5 shows that even though some pathological outliers exist, the vast majority of attacks are detected in a relatively short time. The average number for this particular data plot is 6 time slices.
Number of time slices until random distribution detects an attack
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Distributed intrusion detection is a powerful tool against sophisticated adversaries that do not generate high-visibility events that can be easily caught by traditional means. In this paper, we seek to overcome two challenges: the disclosure of potentially sensitive information to collaborating entities. and the tradeoff between latency and bandwidth used for exchanging information.
Worminator creates compact watchlists of IP addresses encoded in Bloom Filters. The use of Bloom Filters minimizes the amount of sensitive information exposed to third parties (that are participating in the distributed IDS), without hampering the detection effort itself. Furthermore, this compact representation lessens the impact of the distributed computation on the network' and simplifies the corretation process itself, One of the key contributions of this paper is the introduction of the notion of a dynamic overlay that follows a particular schedule to avoid the problems associated with chum in P2P networks, The system creates federations of nodes that exchange the watchlist and varys the rate at which nodes join and leave these groups. Our experiments and simulations show that even a randomized schedule can detect distributed attacks within an average of six exchange periods without using an unacceptable amount of bandwidth to distribute alert information to peers.
We will continue to study methods for low cost alert distribution and propagation. In addition, we envision developing metrics for ranking the threat level for particular "verticals", or groups of organizations. The deployment of collaborate distributed intrusion detection allows and organization to take mitigation and preemptive threat responses without having been directly attacked.
